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EVIDENCE
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Evidence questions of more than usual interest and diffi-
culty were presented to the Supreme Court of South Carolina
during the period covered by this Survey. Discussion herein
must be of a summary nature, but some of the problems de-
serve more fully detailed treatment in students' casenotes in
in the future.
Hearsay - Declaration Against Penal Interest
McClain v. Anderson Free Press' is one of the most
interesting cases in the law of evidence to be decided by the
Court in many years, if only because three carefully consid-
ered opinions were handed down. McClain, plaintiff in the
action for libel, had been sheriff of Anderson County for
eight years and was running for re-election. One Frank Mar-
tin, who had a "wide-spread reputation for dealing in illegal
liquor," had made statements over a period of time to several
persons, including his brother, Dr. T. W. Martin, that he had
no fear of being arrested by the local authorities because he
was paying protection. To one witness he allegedly had said,
"I pay him (McClain) $25.00 a week myself to let me alone."
'2
Frank Martin committed suicide on May 16, 1956. On May
31, 1956, defendant newspaper printed an article, twelve days
before the primary election for sheriff, containing a statement
by Dr. Martin that his brother "boldly and repeatedly boasted
to me that he was paying protection and immunity." On the
day before the primary, the newspaper republished a portion
of the article, under the headline "Charges of Corruption
Unanswered by McClain." McClain was defeated in the elec-
tion, and shortly thereafter brought this action. Defendant
newspaper pleaded truth as an affirmative defense, and of-
fered as witnesses several persons to whom the deceased,
Frank Maitin, had made statements to the general effect as
quoted above. The trial judge, Honorable J. Henry Johnson,
Circuit Judge, admitted the evidence, but after a verdict for
defendant and on motion for new trial, reversed himself, rul-
ing that the testimony was hearsay and inadmissible.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 232 S. C. 448, 102 S. E. 2d 750 (1958).
2. Transcript of Record, p. 8, f. 29; 102 S. E. 2d 750, 753.
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The Supreme Court affirmed, Mr. Justice Moss writing an
opinion, in which Mr. Justice Taylor concurred. Mr. Justice
Oxner and Chief Justice Stukes concurred in the result on the
evidence point,3 Justice Oxner filing this opinion. Mr. Justice
Legge dissented. The opinion of Mr. Justice Moss points out
the undeniable fact that in the majority of jurisdictions in
this country the "declaration against interest" exception to
the hearsay rule is confined to declarations against "proprie-
tary or pecuniary interest," and does not embrace declarations
against penal interest. However, prior to the instant case,
Judge Whaley in his Handbook 4 had read the 1850 decision
of Coleman and Lipscomb v. Frazier5 as placing South Caro-
lina firmly in the minority, recognizing declarations against
penal interest as admissible. Justice Moss disposed of the
Coleman case by reducing to dicta the statements of the Court
in that case on declarations against penal interest; it seems
clear, however, that the Coleman remarks were not dicta
but a joint holding.6 Having disposed of Coleman, Mr. Justice
Moss then adopts the majority view without discussion of its
wisdom. His opinion indicates, however, that he might be
troubled by the applicability of a contrary ruling to the ad-
missibility in a criminal prosecution of a hearsay confession
by a person not in court that he committed the crime with
which the defendant is charged, the problem of the dictum in
the Sussex Peerage Case? and the holding of Donnelly v.
United States.8
Mr. Justice Legge's scholarly dissent points out first that
the Coleman decision was clearly a joint holding; "neither
ruling is obiter; nor is the ruling on one ground less authori-
tative than that on another."9 The Justice then argues that
the rule of the Coleman decision is a sound rule, stating, "It is
3. Error was also found by the trial judge in his instructions on the
law of libel as applied to the facts. The Chief Justice agreed with the
dissent of Mr. Justice Legge on this point.
4. Whaley, Handbook on South Carolina Evidence, 4A S. C. L. Q.
(Supplement) 130 (1957).
5. 4 Rich. Law 146, 53 Am. Dec. 727 (18 0).
6. The statements in that case were not only against the penal inter-
est of the declarant, but were made in the presence of the defendant,
who received the statements as true and acted upon them. Mr. Justice
Moss in the instant case argues that the latter constituted an adoptive
admission and was the real holding of the Coleman case.
7. 11 Cl. & F. 109 (1844).
8. 228 U. S. 243 (1913), a 6-3 decision with Mr. Justice Holmes
writing the dissent.
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difficult to perceive sound reason for excluding a declaration
against penal interest while admitting one against pecuniary
interest." The leading modern text writers support this
view,1 0 as do some respected judicial pronouncements," as
Justice Legge points out.
12
The concurring justices seek middle ground by upholding
the admissibility of declarations against penal interest, but
refusing to apply that doctrine to a declaration which impli-
cates not only the declarant but a third party as well, as here.
Mr. Justice Oxner reasons: "Closely analagous is the doc-
trine of admissions and confessions which permit such state-
ment to be considered only against the person making it."' 3
Also closely analagous would seem to be the cases governing
admissibility of statements of present intent by a declarant.
Statements indicating an intention to perform future acts with
a third person have been admitted in evidence by many
courts, 1 4 but where the statements concern past acts involving
a third person, they have been excluded.' 5
Dead Man's Statute - Writings of the Deceased On the
Subject at Issue
In Harris v. Berry,'6 in a proceeding contesting the validity
of her husband's will on the grounds of undue influence and
lack of capacity, plaintiff, wife of deceased, objected to the
admission in evidence of certain letters written by deceased to
various members of his family and beneficiaries of the will.
The trial judge excluded the letters under the Dead Man's
Statute.17 On appeal, this ruling was held error, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Legge. The Court said :1s
10. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 1476 et seq. (1954); 5 WiGMORE, Evi-
DENcE §§ 1476-1477 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S. W. 2d 284, 162 A. L. R. 437
(1945); cf. People v. Lettrick, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N. E. 2d 488 (1952).
Just as significant of changing judicial attitude toward declarations
against interest are such cases as Weber v. Chicago etc. Ry., 175 Iowa
358, 151 N. W. 852, L. R. A. 1918A 626 (1915), in which the concept
of declarations against "pecuniary and proprietary interest" is stretched
to embrace situations like that in the instant case. None of the opinions
deal with the argument that the declarations herein might have been
against pecuniary interest because they subject the declarant to possible
liability in a libel action.
12. McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S. C. 448, 470, 102 S. E. 2d
750, 761 (1958).
13. Id., 232 S. C. 448, 467, 102 S. E. 2d 750, 760 (1958).
14. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285 (1892).
15. Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96 (1933).
16. 231 S. C. 201, 98 S. E. 2d 251 (1957).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-402.
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There can be no doubt that, had any of the letters in
question been lost, the witness could not have testified,
over objection, to its contents. In such case she would
have been clearly barred by the statute, Boozer v. Teague,
27 S. C. 348, 3 S. E. 551....
The precise question appears not to have been passed
upon in this jurisdiction or in any of the cases in other
jurisdictions to which our attention has been directed;
but we are clearly of the opinion that under the facts
of the present case the letters were not within the pro-
hibition of Section 26-402. Having been identified as be-
fore stated, no testimony by the interested witness was
needed to prove their contents. They would have spoken
for themselves.
Assuming that the statute applies in wills contests, the dis-
tinction the Court makes between writings and oral communi-
cations has merit. As Justice Legge points out, the ban of
the statute "is directed against the witness, not the 'trans-
action or communication,"' and the statute is to be strictly
construed. 19 This being so, the documents themselves are ad-
missible if a proper foundation can be laid. But as the Court
says: "The witnesses testified, without objection, to their
receipt and that the handwriting was that of the decedent;
the letters were marked for identification; and counsel for the
proponent then offered them in evidence." 20 Only then was
objection interposed. But counsel did not challenge their rele-
vance, nor raise a genuine issue of authenticity of the writ-
ings. In other words, the "transaction or communication"
with the deceased, barred by the statute, was the receipt of
the letters and not the letters themselves. Once the receipt
and identification are offered without objection, the statute
has been waived; Stark 'v. Hopson21 is early and unchallenged
authority that objection must be timely. Once in evidence, the
letters speak for themselves. If this be strained reasoning,
the words of Jeremy Bentham are sufficient in justification :2
Exceptions, self-contradictions, spring up everywhere
under their feet; exceptions, and, as far as they extend,
all reasonable. Reasonable, and why? Because, the rule
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 207, 98 S. E. 2d 251, 254 (1957).
21. 22 S. C. 42 (1884).
22. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), quoted in 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 687, 688 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 1I
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itself being fundamentally absurd, everything must be
reasonable which goes to narrow its extent.
However, a more sweeping justification for the holding
might be made, challenging the apparent assumption of the
Court that if the communication had been oral, or had the
letters been lost, testimony would have been inadmissible.
The purpose of the Dead Man's Statute purportedly is to pro-
tect the estate of the deceased against claims founded on al-
leged transactions, usually of a contractual nature, with the
deceased. Here we have no threat of diminution of the estate;
the dispute is entirely within the estate. It is doubtful that
in this class of litigation the statute should have application,
and the majority of the courts in this country support this
view.
23
Reai Evidence - Laying a Foundati6n for Admission
Benton v. Pelum24 is a decision that deserves careful study
by every law enforcement agency in the State, and by lawyers
as well. In an action for negligence against the driver of a
car brought by a guest passenger, the defense raised was that
the driver of the other car involved in the collision was the
negligent party, and was highly intoxicated at the time of
the accident. To prove intoxication, defendant offered in evi-
dence the result of a blood analysis of samples of blood taken
from himself and from the other driver; the trial judge ex-
cluded this report on the ground that a proper foundation had
not been laid. To lay the foundation, defendant offered as
witnesses the technologist who drew the blood samples, the
superintendent of the hospital which sent the specimens out to
the Medical College for analysis, and the chemist who made
the tests. The technologist testified that he took the blood
samples at about 12:30 a.m., December 25th (the accident oc-
curred at 11:00 p.m. the night before), placed each sample in
a vial labeled with the name of the person whose blood was
taken, and that these vials were wrapped for mailing to the
Medical College at Charleston, along with a request that a test
be made. He testified that in accordance with customary
practice he placed the package on the desk of the Superin-
tendent of his hospital (the Colleton County Hospital). The
23. Cases are collected in Notes, 115 A. L. R. 1425 and 173 A. L. R.
1282 (no South Carolina cases cited). The problem of admissibility of
parol evidence of revocation of a will is analagous.
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Superintendent then testified that it was likely that he mailed
the package that day but he had no specific knowledge that
he did. The chemist at the Medical College testified that his
secretary places specimens received in the mail for analysis
on his desk, and that on December 27th he found a package
on his desk containing two samples bearing the names of the
defendant and the other driver, which samples he tested and
found that the samples containing the name of the other
driver indicated a person who was highly intoxicated at the
time the sample was taken. The Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Oxner, affirmed the exclusion of the report
based on an analysis of these samples, stating as follows :25
... While proof need not negative all possibility of tam-
pering, People v. Riser, 47 Cal. (2d) 566, 305 P. (2d) 1,
it is generally held that the party offering such specimen
is required to establish, at least as far as practicable, a
complete chain of evidence, tracing possession from the
time the specimen is taken from the human body to the
final custodian by whom it is analyzed. (citing cases)....
We do not think the proof here is sufficient to show
continuity in the chain of custody. There is no evidence
that the technologist who drew the samples sealed the
vials or otherwise took any precautions against tamper-
ing. He wrapped them and placed the package on the desk
of the superintendent. Just how long it remained there
or by whom removed, we do not know. Neither is it defi-
nitely shown that the package was mailed at Walterboro.
It is true that several of the witnesses referred to its be-
ing mailed but this was necessarily either a mere con-
clusion based on hearsay or an inference from the cus-
tomary method of handling these specimens. The record
does not disclose who had possession of the package from
the early morning of December 25th until the chemist
at the Medical College opened it on December 27th. There
is no testimony by whom the package was received at
the Medical College. This missing link could have prob-
ably been supplied by the chemist's secretary who was not
offered as a witness. There was no effort at the trial
to produce the vials, the labels, or the request for a
blood analysis so as to determine whether or not the
25. 232 S. C. 26, 33-34, 100 S. E. 2d 534, 537-538.
[Vol. 11
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technologist could identify them as those he wrapped for
mailing.
The following cases support the exclusion of this testi-
mony: Rodgers v. Commonwealth, supra, 197 Va. 527, 90
S. E. (2d) 257; Brown v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R. 144, 240
S. W. (2d) 310; Nichols v. McCoy, Cal. App., 235 P. (2d)
412; Novak v. District of Columbia, 82 U. S. App., D. C.,
95, 160 F. (2d) 588; People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491,
146 N. Y. S. (2d) 359.26
Admissibility of Secondary Evidence
In Wynn v. Coney,2 7 Wynn and Brunson, a lumber-selling
partnership, sued the partners of Coney-Davis Lumber Co.,
and Hamptonite Door Mfg. Co., a corporation, for balance due
on purchase price of lumber sold and delivered. The evidence
of the plaintiffs showed that Hamptonite had been in financial
difficulty, its credit was poor, and in order to enable Hamp-
tonite to get stock lumber from Wynn and Brunson, Coney-
Davis purchased lumber on its credit from Wynn, and resold
the lumber to Hamptonite. Coney-Davis was holder of a lien
on the properties of Hamptonite, and acted to keep Hampton-
ite in business, to protect its own claim against the latter.
As lumber was delivered under this agreement, plaintiffs
claimed that a tally sheet was prepared, and on Friday of
each week this sheet was turned in to Hamptonite to show the
amount and price of lumber sold and delivered during that
week. Wynn and Brunson kept no records of these trans-
actions otherwise. When Hamptonite failed to pay for all the
lumber, Brunson and the attorney for the partnership went
to the Hamptonite office, copied from the original records
the amounts of lumber shipped and the prices indicated. From
this information, plaintiff's attorney prepared an itemized ac-
count, which he attached to the verified complaint. Notice to
produce the originals was served on Coney-Davis and on
Hamptonite, and at the trial, plaintiff offered in evidence this
itemized verified statement of account, over defendant's ob-
jection that the original tally sheets were the best evidence.
Defendant Coney-Davis produced some of the original sales
slips, but argued that the rest of them were not in court, but
were in the possession of Hamptonite, and that hence the best
evidence was not in court. In affirming the ruling of the lower
26. Oases are collected in Annot., 21 A. L. R. 2d 1216 et seq.
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court holding that the account was admissible in evidence, the
Supreme Court said through Mr. Justice Moss :28
We conclude that there was no error on the part of the
trial Judge in admitting as evidence the statement at-
tached to the complaint. We reach this conclusion because
it appears from the testimony that the original records
of the respondents had been delivered to the appellants
or to Hamptonite, pursuant to the directions of the ap-
pellants. It further appears that proper notice was given
to the appellants and Hamptonite to produce these orig-
inal records. This they failed to do. We think that the
respondents had made the necessary preliminary showing
of the necessity and propriety of offering secondary evi-
dence of the contents of the records in question.
Relevancy and Prejudice - Testimony That Defendant
Insured
MeLeod v. Rose 29 involved another troublesome application
of the doctrine that evidence that the defendant is insured
against liability is "extraneous and highly prejudicial.'8 0
Plaintiff was struck and injured by defendant's automobile,
driven by the latter. Defendant called as a witness a police
officer, one McKissick, who testified that he interviewed the
plaintiff at the hospital after the accident, and that plaintiff
told him then that he didn't think the driver of the car was at
fault. On cross-examination, the officer admitted having told
plaintiff's counsel that he didn't know anything about the case.
Cross-examination continued :3
"Q. Did you make a report of the accident? A. I have
the notes, but I think I made an accident report of it, but
we can't find it in the office. The notes I had I am unable
to locate them, and besides that, the statement I gave,
which I saw just now.
"Q. Who did you give that statement to? A. To the insur-
ance adjuster."
The trial court ordered the jury to disregard the testimony
as to insurance, but refused to grant the defendant a mistrial.
This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Oxner which stressed the facts that the wit-
28. Id. at 354-355, 102 S. E. 2d 209, 213.
29. 231 S. C. 209, 97 S. E. 2d 899 (1957).
30. Wood v. England, 226 S. C. 73, 83 S. E. 2d 644 (1954). Some of
the authorities are discussed in Whaley, op cit. note 4 supra, 67-72.
31. McLeod v. Rose, 231 S. C. 209, 211, 97 S. E. 2d 899, 900 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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ness was defendant's witness, that defendant's counsel indi-
cated before the response that he anticipated the answer,
32
but did not make a formal objection then, and that the plain-
tiff's counsel had no reason to anticipate the answer given.
Thus the Court classifies the case with those recognizing an
exception to the rule where the insurance coverage is brought
out unintentionally by examining counsel. 3
Parol Evidence Rule
In Lundy v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co.3 4 plaintiff had two fire
insurance policies issued by defendant company, No. 551316
on his home and No. 551318 on his store building, both issued
to him through defendant White, local agent of defendant com-
pany. The house policy covered the period of one year com-
mencing February 10, 1955. On August 4, 1955, the company
mailed to the insured a check for $12.69 on which the following
notation appeared :5







Enclosed in the same envelope was a formal Notice of Cancel-
lation cancelling policy No. 551318 (the store policy). Plain-
tiff testified that he called White, asking an explanation, and
White told him that the cancellation "is on the store and they
haven't sent you enough money back;" "the house is all right;
you ain't got nothing to worry about."3 6 On January 27,
1956, the house was destroyed by fire. At the trial, defendant
argued that the notation on the check was clear and un-
ambiguous and invoked the parol evidence rule to exclude oral
testimony of the conversations with White. The trial court
admitted the evidence, verdict was for plaintiff and the Su-
preme Court sustained the judgment thereon, saying, by Mr.
Justice Oxner :37
32. Id. at 213: "It seems to be conceded that when plaintiff's counsel
asked the question, 'who did you give the statement to:', defendant's
counsel, without addressing the court, remarked 'you better look out' ".
33. McCoRiaicic, EVIDENCE 356 (1954).
34. 232 S. C. 1, 100 S. E. 2d 544 (1957).
35. 232 S. C. 1, 5, 100 S. E. 2d 544, 545.
36. Ibid., 100 S. E. 2d 544, 546.
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.... It is further urged that the statement of White to
respondent to the effect that the policy on the store and
not on the house was cancelled was incompetent as "an
attempt to vary by oral testimony the terms of a clear
and unambiguous written instrument (the check)." There
is no merit in this contention. Respondent was not seek-
ing to contradict or vary the notation on the check but
offered this testimony to explain its acceptance and to
rebut the inference of consent or waiver arising from
cashing it. See 80 [sic] Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 337.
Miscellaneous Rulings
Opinion Evidence. In Green v. Sparks,38 the Court once
again39 held that a witness who had observed skid marks
after an accident but had not seen the accident itself could
not give his opinion as to the cause of skidding; the subject
is not one for expert testimony, being within the ordinary
realm of experience, and the witness can present his informa-
tion as to what he observed without resort to such speculation.
In Avant v. Johnson40 the Court applied the recognized rule
that opinion testimony of a medical expert is ordinarily not
conclusive, where there is creditable contrary testimony in
evidence. The action was one to set aside a deed on the grounds
of undue influence and lack of capacity. A doctor testified
that the grantor, since deceased, at the time of the conveyance
exhibited signs of cerebral arteriosclerosis; he did not think
that she was competent to make a decision of any kind. A
second doctor offered like views, also based upon personal
examination of the grantor during the period in which the
conveyance had been made. However, the lawyer participating
in the conveyance, representing a lender of funds on the se-
curity of the transferred property, testified to the care with
which he questioned the grantor at that time, and this evidence
together with other lay testimony was held sufficient in pro-
bative force to permit the jury to credit it notwithstanding
the medical testimony.
Judicial Notice. In two cases, the Court took judicial notice,
based on common knowledge, of propositions of fact. In
38. 232 S. 0. 414, 102 S. E. 2d 435 (1958).
39. Thompson v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 224 S. C. 338,
79 S. E. 2d 16D (1953).
40. 231 S. C. 119, 97 S. E. 2d 396 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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Roper v. South Carolina Tax Commission4 ' the Court noticed
that preferred stock has different characteristics from com-
mon stock, and presumed that the preferred stock involved
in the litigation, stock of a South Carolina corporation, had
been issued pursuant to South Carolina law, and had the
characteristics set forth in the South Carolina statutes gov-
erning issuance of preferred. 42 In Saxon v. Saxon 43 the Court
noticed that high temperatures increase the danger of blowout
of a weak tire, and that weak tires were likely to blow out on
a hot day at high speed, especially when driven with a heavy
load.
Sufficiency of Evidence. As is usually the case, many of the
appeals raised the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict or decision of the lower court. These
cases are more appropriately discussed under the various
headings of substantive law, and cannot be dealt with ade-
quately without a careful analysis of the Record on Appeal.
Included in this category are Floyd v. Town of Lake City
44
(negligence), Concrete Mix, Inc. v. James45 (goods sold and
delivered), and Bailes v. Southern Ry.4 6 (wrongful death).
41. 231 S. C. 587, 599, 99 S. E. 2d 377, 383 (1957), discussed in this
Survey under Taxation.
42. CoDE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 12-211 et seq.
43. 231 S. C. 378, 382, 98 S. E. 2d 803, 805-806 (1957).
44. 231 S. C. 516, 99 S. E. 2d 181 (1957).
45. 231 S. C. 416, 98 S. E. 2d 841 (1957).
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